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WHAT IF MADISON HAD WON?
IMAGINING A CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF
LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
ALISON L. LACROIX*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1787, when the delegates to the Constitutional Convention
gathered in Philadelphia, one of the most formidable hurdles they faced was
building a functional federal government that contained more than one sovereign. 
Throughout much of the colonial period, British North American political
thinkers had challenged the orthodox metropolitan insistence on unitary
sovereignty vested in Parliament, and the accompanying metropolitan aversion
to any constitutional system that appeared to create an imperium in imperio, or
a sovereign within a sovereign.   By the 1780s, despite much disagreement1
among the members of the founding generation as to the precise balance between
sovereigns, both political theory and lived experience had convinced Americans
that their system could, and indeed must, not just accommodate but also depend
upon multiple levels of government.2
Identifying the proper degree of federal supremacy and the best means of
building it into the constitutional structure were thus central concerns for many
members of the founding generation.   Their real project was an institutional one: 3
whether—which soon became how—to replace the highly decentralized,
legislature-centered structure of the Articles of Confederation with a more robust,
multi-branch general government to serve as the constitutional hub connecting
the state spokes.  In preparing for the convention, Virginia delegate James
Madison, who was at the time also a member of the Confederation Congress,
conducted an exhaustive study of ancient and modern confederacies.   Madison4
hoped to find lessons about how to avoid what he viewed as the fatal “defect”
that had ultimately destroyed them all:  the lack of “subjection in the members
to the general authority,” which Madison concluded had “ruined the whole
Body.”   In order to avoid following these storied confederacies into the dim5
annals of history, Madison argued that the United States government must be
armed with a “negative,” or a veto, on state legislation.   The negative would be6
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  The author thanks William
Birdthistle, Adam Cox, and Aziz Huq for helpful discussions and Gerard Magliocca for organizing
this Symposium.  Thanks are also due to the Mayer Brown Faculty Research Fund.
1. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 133-34
(2010). 
2. See id. at 132-33.
3. See id. at 83-84, 132-35.
4. Notes on Ancient and Modern Confederacies, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 3, 3-
24 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975).
5. Id. at 8.
6. See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 138-39.
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vested in Congress—most likely the Senate—and would operate as a broad check
by the federal legislature on the states.   Madison even went so far as to suggest7
that congressional approval would be the “necessary final step” in the states’
legislative processes.   The negative would thus have given the general8
government a standing power to intervene in the state lawmaking process.
This Essay asks what would have happened if Madison had convinced his
fellow delegates that the negative was desirable and necessary.  It then asks what
would have happened if the Constitution had therefore vested ultimate
supervisory power over federal supremacy in Congress, rather than in the federal
courts by way of the mechanism of judicial review that the delegates ultimately
adopted via the Supremacy Clause.9
One potential response to this question is:  nothing, or at least nothing
materially different, would have happened.  The modern constitutional landscape
in a world with the federal negative would look functionally similar to the
existing constitutional arrangement in which federal supremacy is doubly secured
by judicial review and Congress’s power to preempt state legislation.  On this
view, the subjunctive of the “what would have happened” inquiry should be
refashioned into a declarative “what did happen” statement.  Thus, one might
argue, both the negative and preemption should be seen as legislative safeguards
of federalism’s commitment to the supremacy of the general government. 
But the apparent functional equivalence between the negative and
preemption begins to erode upon closer examination.  In particular, at least three
important differences separate the negative and preemption:  the scope that each
ascribes to Congress’s power to act in arenas beyond its enumerated Article I
powers; the default presumption of each approach toward the validity of state
legislation; and the meaning each attributes to congressional silence.  Moreover,
the functional inquiry is a post hoc one that emphasizes abstract similarities
between the negative and preemption as determined ahistorically, without
reference to any specific constitutional issue or moment in time.  The focus of
this Essay, in contrast, seeks to be more historical:  how would the adoption of
the negative have changed the arguments and analysis that contemporaries
offered in particular instances of constitutional conflict?  
This Essay therefore examines the potential significance of the negative
through the lens of a nineteenth-century case study:  the debate over Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce.  Had the negative been incorporated into
the Constitution in 1787, the combined force of the negative’s distinctive
characteristics and the precedent that it established in one constitutional
controversy after another might ultimately have led not to the stronger union that
Madison desired, but to forceful resistance to federal power by diverse state
legislatures in a variety of circumstances.  In contrast to Madison’s and many
modern commentators’ understanding of the negative as a highly centralizing
mechanism, then, the successful negative might potentially have led to
7. Id. at 135.
8. Id. at 153.
9. See id. at 171-72.
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fragmentation and disintegration between the federal center and the state
peripheries decades before the sectional crisis ignited in the 1860s.
I.  THE FEDERAL NEGATIVE
Long before the Philadelphia Convention began its deliberations, Madison
was troubled by what he and many other political thinkers perceived as the
dangerous weakness of the federal government.   Under the Articles of10
Confederation, the sole institution through which federal authority operated was
“the United States, in Congress assembled.”   Madison and others—including11
George Washington, John Adams, and James Wilson—spent the early 1780s
increasingly worried about parochial state legislation, the inability of Congress
to collect revenues and thus service the nation’s war debt, the nation’s lack of
international credibility, and the consequences of occasional violent uprisings
against the general government such as Shays’ Rebellion.   Anxious12
correspondents from Georgia to Maine fretted over what they viewed as the
“imbecility” and impotence of the Confederation.   “Our situation is becoming13
every day more [and] more critical,” Madison wrote.   “No money comes into14
the federal Treasury.  No respect is paid to the federal authority; and people of
reflection unanimously agree that the existing Confederacy is tottering to its
foundation.”15
But Madison had a solution, which he described in a letter to Thomas
Jefferson.   “Over [and] above the positive power of regulating trade and sundry16
other matters in which uniformity is proper,” Madison’s reform plan would “arm
the federal head with a negative in all cases whatsoever on the local
Legislatures.”   Based on his archival research, Madison believed that the17
negative would provide the best institutional solution to what he viewed as the
key problem of federal supremacy.   Vesting the general government,18
specifically Congress, with the power to veto any and all laws passed by the state
legislatures would ensure that states would no longer be able to engage in purely
10. The following paragraphs build on my earlier discussions of these topics.  See generally
id. (especially chapter 5, which discusses central government authority).
11. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
12. See PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788,
at 11-17 (2010).  See generally GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969) (describing the crises of the 1780s).
13. See MAIER, supra note 12, at 264.
14. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Feb. 25, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 299.
15. Id.
16. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 317, 318.
17. Id.
18. See Madison’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 164, 164-65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
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self-serving regulation to the detriment of their neighbors or to the Union as a
whole.   If a state passed a law penalizing out-of-state creditors or establishing19
its own import duties, Congress would have the power to veto that law. 
Moreover, the state law in question would not need to rise to the level of
unconstitutionality, and members of Congress would not be required to make a
particularized finding about precisely how the state law would harm the Union. 
Instead, Madison insisted that Congress must have the power to veto state laws
“in all cases whatsoever.”20
Indeed, Madison’s notes and correspondence demonstrate that he viewed the
negative as the complement to Congress’s power to approve state legislation.  To
be sure, this approval would be expressed silently, by the absence of a veto; but
Madison clearly regarded some action by Congress as the necessary final step in
the state legislative process.  Under the negative, “[t]he States [could] of
themselves then pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a Legislature
where there are two branches, can proceed without the other,” Madison
insisted.   The negative would therefore have given the federal government a21
continuous power to intervene in the state lawmaking process and to override
state laws.
Despite Madison’s efforts to convince his fellow delegates of the negative’s
virtues (including a speech in which he described it as a helpful adaptation of the
Privy Council’s power to review colonial legislation under the empire),  the22
negative ultimately failed to win sufficient support in the Convention to become
part of the Constitution.  Instead, a few days after the final defeat of the negative,
the delegates moved toward a different institutional approach to the supremacy
question.   Instead of a legislative solution, the majority of delegates shifted23
toward a judicial mechanism.   In arguing against the negative, Gouverneur24
Morris articulated a strong preference for a judicial device:  “A law that ought
to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary [department] and if that security
should fail; may be repealed by a [National] law.”   Writing from Paris,25
Jefferson responded to Madison’s enthusiasm for the negative with a critique of
its overbreadth.   The negative, Jefferson argued, “proposes to mend a small hole26
by covering the whole garment.  Not more than 1. out of 100. state-acts concern
the confederacy.  This proposition then, in order to give [Congress] 1. degree of
19. Id.
20. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 19, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 317, 318 (emphasis omitted).
21. Madison’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 18, at 165.
22. Id. at 168.
23. Madison’s Notes (July 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 18, at 25, 28.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (June 20, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 63, 64 (1977).
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power which they ought to have, gives them 99. more which they ought not to
have. . . .”   Instead of the negative, Jefferson advocated “an appeal from the27
state judicatures to a federal court, in all cases where the act of Confederation
[controlled] the question.”   This judicial remedy would, he argued, “be as28
effectual a remedy, [and] exactly commensurate to the defect.”29
Within a few weeks, the delegates adopted what became the Supremacy
Clause of Article VI, which states that the “Constitution, and the laws of the
United States . . . and all Treaties . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land,” and
that “the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby.”   Read in conjunction30
with the judiciary provisions of Article III, the Supremacy Clause endorsed
judicial review of state law for conformity with federal law as the Constitution’s
chief supremacy-enforcing mechanism.   The Supremacy Clause-Article III31
complex established a norm of federal supremacy at the level of state legislation
and insisted that that norm would be backed by judicial enforcement.  Rather
than giving Congress the power to wield a negative over state laws, then, the
Constitution provided for a Supreme Court with the power to review state laws
for compatibility with the Constitution.  32
II.  PREEMPTION:  THE FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE NEGATIVE?
The rejection of the negative by the Philadelphia Convention should be
understood not only as a loss for the specific plan that Madison proposed, but
also as a move by the delegates away from legislature-based approaches to what
they viewed as the problem of supremacy.  To be sure, in addition to proposing
the negative, Madison’s Virginia Plan emphasized the need to give Congress
greater substantive powers,  especially over commerce and taxation.  The33
negative would have given Congress the power to stop New York from passing
an impost that would require Connecticut residents to pay taxes to New York on
goods imported through New York.  But Congress’s corresponding affirmative
power to regulate import duties was also a vital element of Madison’s reform
plan, one that—unlike the negative—ultimately won adoption at the
convention.   The combination of the congressional powers listed in Article I,34
Section 8, with the limitations on congressional powers in Section 9 and on the
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
31. See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 168-69.
32. Id. at 165.
33. See Virginia Plan, para. 6, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 12, 16
(1977) (“Resolved . . . that the national Legislature ought to be impowered [sic] . . . to legislate in
all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States
may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation . . . .”).
34. See id.
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states in Section 10,  together with the principle of enumeration itself, suggested35
that the delegates were intensely focused on setting clear boundaries that would
define the respective substantive powers of the state and federal legislatures.  
Nevertheless, the enumeration of Congress’s powers in Article I was, for
many delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, not an adequate solution to the
problem of establishing federal supremacy.  The Articles of Confederation had
sought to maintain a balance between the powers of the states and those of the
general government by focusing entirely on the powers of the two levels of
legislature.   The Confederation Congress had the power to declare peace and36
war, to enter into treaties, to settle disputes between the states, to regulate the
value of coinage, to establish a post office, and to regulate trade with Indian
tribes.   It could also request, but not require, that the states contribute funds to37
the common treasury.   The Articles thus represented an attempt by American38
thinkers of the revolutionary period to enshrine in the new general government
the type of subject-matter separation between the respective powers of the states
and the general government for which they had argued during the constitutional
crisis with the British Empire in the 1760s and 1770s.   The colonial rejoinder39
to metropolitan assertions of unitary parliamentary sovereignty and against
imperium in imperio had insisted that no imperium in imperio existed when the
powers and duties of the imperia in question were clearly demarcated and did not
overlap.   Thus, commentators such as John Dickinson, John Adams, and40
Thomas Jefferson had labored during the 1760s and 1770s to demonstrate that
the separate legislative domains of Parliament and the colonial assemblies might
coexist, as long as all parties agreed on an overarching distinction between the
types of authority each might permissibly wield.   For Dickinson, the dividing41
line lay between taxation to regulate the empire (permissible for Parliament to
regulate) and taxation to raise a revenue from the colonies (reserved to the
colonial assemblies).   For Adams and Jefferson, as for some agents of the42
British Empire such as colonial governors Thomas Pownall and Francis Bernard,
the line of separation was somewhat murkier but lay between the general arenas
of external matters concerning the entire empire (overseen by Parliament) and
matters internal to each province (reserved to the colonial assemblies).43
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-10.
36. See generally ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781.
37. Id. at art. IX.
38. Id. at art. VIII.
39. See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 60-67; see also Alison L. LaCroix, Rhetoric and Reality
in Early American Legal History:  A Reply to Gordon Wood, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011)
[hereinafter LaCroix, Rhetoric].
40. See LaCroix, Rhetoric, supra note 39, at 733-34.
41. See id.
42. See [John Dickinson], Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, to the Inhabitants of the
British Colonies 17 (1767), available at http://ia700407.us.archive.org/11/items/cihm_14505/cihm_
14505.pdf.
43. See John Adams, Novanglus No. III, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND
2011] WHAT IF MADISON HAD WON? 47
Much of the energy driving the constitutional reforms of the 1760s through
the early 1780s thus focused on allocating specific powers between different
levels of legislatures.  By the mid-1780s, however, the perceived exigencies of
the postwar period had driven Madison and many of his contemporaries to
believe that a functioning constitution must do more than describe arenas of
legislative authority.   A functioning constitution, one that would provide a44
normative vision for government in addition to a simple description of
institutions and powers, would provide some supervening authority to assess
whether the competing legislatures had in fact trenched on each other’s power in
a given situation.   Indeed, although Madison’s negative offered a legislative45
solution to the problem of supremacy, it did not make more specific declarations
about the relative powers of each legislature.  Instead, the negative promoted one
of the legislatures—Congress—to the level of umpire, with the authority to
decide when the state legislatures had overstepped their powers.   The negative,46
therefore, like the judicial review that supplanted it, added an overarching
structural mechanism aimed at settling boundary disputes between various
branches of legislative power.  Although their supporters emphasized different
institutions (Congress for one, the Supreme Court for the other),  the negative47
and judicial review shared a similar commitment to writing a fundamental,
structural rule of intergovernmental conflict resolution into the Constitution. 
This focus by the mid-1780s not just on “who decides,” but on “who decides who
decides,” represented a shift from enumeration and boundary-demarcation toward
the identification of an ultimate interpretive authority as a means of ameliorating
what contemporaries came to view as the inevitable friction between American
federalism’s multiple levels of government.   The negative, therefore, was not48
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 29, 37-38 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851); FRANCIS
BERNARD, SELECT LETTERS ON THE TRADE AND GOVERNMENT OF AMERICA; AND THE PRINCIPLES
OF LAW AND POLITY, APPLIED TO THE AMERICAN COLONIES (Kessinger Publishing 2007) (1774);
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A SUMMARY VIEW OF THE RIGHTS OF BRITISH AMERICA (Limitless Press 2010)
(1774); THOMAS POWNALL, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES (2d ed. 1765).
44. See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 169-71.
45. See generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1967) (analyzing the American Revolution).  Morton Horwitz has characterized the
work of Bailyn as distinguishing between small-c constitutions and large-C Constitutions.  See
Morton J. Horwitz, A Historiography of The People Themselves and Popular Constitutionalism,
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 813, 817 (2006).
46. Note that under the Virginia Plan, Congress was not the sole arbiter of the balance
between federal and state legislation.  Article VIII of the plan proposed a “[c]ouncil of revision”
comprising “the Executive and a Convenient number of the National Judiciary,” who would be
vested with “authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, [and]
every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final.”  Virginia Plan, para.
8, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 12, 16 (1977).
47. See supra Part I.
48. Cf. DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT:  THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING 88 (Wilson Carey McWilliams & Lance Banning eds., 2003) (describing the Coercive
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simply a more elaborate form of enumeration.  
Moreover, the negative differed in important ways from the modern form of
interlegislature dialogue:  preemption.  Recall Gouverneur Morris’s critique of
the negative on the floor of the convention, moments before it was voted down
once and for all:  “A law that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the
Judiciary [department] and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a
[National] law.”   Morris’s succinct statement set forth a spectrum of potential49
solutions to the problem of supremacy:  (1) the negative; (2) judicial review; and
(3) preemption, or repeal of a state law by a national law.  For Morris, as for
many of his contemporaries, the negative presented an altogether distinct (and
undesirable) mode of policing federal supremacy that differed in important ways
from both judicial review and preemption.  
Morris’s reference to the possibility that a state law might be “repealed by
a [National] law” is intriguing because it appears to assume that even without any
specific textual grant of power to Congress, that body could override state laws. 
A similar presumption had long underpinned Anglo-American law under the
empire, for the earliest colonial charters had mandated that laws passed by the
provincial assemblies be “as neere as conveniently may, agreeable to the forme
[sic] of the lawes [sic] [and] pollicy [sic] of England.”   Throughout the50
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, most British and British North
American commentators adhered to the view that Parliament had at least some
authority to legislate for the colonies by specifically mentioning them in its
acts.   In addition, the hybrid legislative-adjudicative body of the Privy Council51
had the power to invalidate specific colonial laws from its seat in Whitehall.  52
By 1787, when Morris set forth his array of alternatives to the negative, his
fellow delegates seemed comfortable with the notion that Congress could
Acts of 1774 as standing for the proposition not that Parliament was to decide every issue, but that
it “was to decide where everything was to be decided”).
49. Madison’s Notes (July 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 18, at 25, 28.
50. See Letters Patent from Elizabeth I to Sir Humfrey Gylberte (1578), in 1 FEDERAL AND
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE,
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 49,
51 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
51. See, e.g., I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107-08 (“Our American plantations
are . . . . distinct (though dependent) dominions.  They are subject, however, to the control of the
parliament; though (like Ireland, Man, and the rest) not bound by any acts of parliament, unless
particularly named.”).  See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: 
COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004) (discussing the “transatlantic constitution” and
the applicability of the laws of England to the colonies); 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:  ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 (Paul A. Freund
ed., 1971).
52. See JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN
PLANTATIONS 503 (1950); 2 EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER, THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND IN THE
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 1603-1784, at 47-48, 293-94 (1928).
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effectively nullify a state law by passing federal legislation that superseded or
conflicted with it.  This view of Congress’s power likely stemmed from
Americans’ familiarity with the multilayered hierarchy of laws under the empire. 
It was also reflected in the “supreme law of the land” language of the Supremacy
Clause, which in the hands of Chief Justice John Marshall and later interpreters
came to amount to a textual basis for Congress’s power effectively to repeal state
law by preempting it through federal legislation.53
The negative might appear to be functionally similar to preemption insofar
as both are mechanisms by which Congress can effectively override state laws. 
Although less formal or textually grounded than the negative, preemption
operates as a means of maintaining federal supremacy by giving Congress a
check on the actions of state legislatures.   Modern case law divides preemption54
into three categories:  express, field, or conflict preemption.   Express55
preemption, based upon Congress’s explicit intention to nullify state law,
provides the closest parallel with the negative.  However, all three species of
preemption might possess the potential to achieve the purposes that Madison
identified:  reducing parochial state legislation, augmenting the power of the
federal government (especially with respect to taxation and commerce), and
increasing individuals’ attachment to the Union.  Indeed, implied
preemption—whether categorized as “field” or “conflict”—might be viewed as
allowing members of Congress to reap the centralizing, power-consolidating
benefits of the negative more covertly than Madison’s scheme would have
permitted.
Yet three important differences between the negative and preemption suggest
53. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824) (“[T]he acts of New-York must
yield to the law of Congress; and the decision sustaining the privilege they confer, against a right
given by a law of the Union, must be erroneous.”); see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt.
Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992).  But cf. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 778-81 (1994); S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: 
A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 842-55 (1992) (challenging the
view that broad preemption principles necessarily follow from the Supremacy Clause).
54. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1353-54 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court has used preemption doctrine to
protect national commercial uniformity); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (discussing preemption by federal agencies).  See generally
WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ET AL., PREEMPTION CHOICE:  THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).
55. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (“Pre-emption may be either express or implied, and ‘is
compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.’ . . . [W]e have recognized at least two types of implied pre-
emption:  field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,’ and conflict
pre-emption, where ‘compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,’
or where state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’”) (citations omitted).
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that the functional-equivalence hypothesis fails to capture either the foundational
beliefs that lay behind Madison’s vision of the negative, or the consequences of
how it would have operated in practice.  These differences center on (1) the
scope that the negative and preemption each ascribes to Congress’s power to act
in areas beyond its enumerated Article I powers; (2) the default presumption of
each toward the validity of state legislation; and (3) the meaning each ascribes
to congressional silence.
The potential scope of Congress’s power in a world with the negative would
have been far broader than the actual scope of Congress’s power when it
preempts state law.  According to Madison’s broadest version of the negative,
Congress would have had the authority to veto any state law that in Congress’s
view was not consistent with the federal interest.  As originally presented to the
convention, the Virginia Plan granted Congress the power to negative state laws
“contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.”  56
When the negative became the central topic of debate just over a week later,
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina moved that the scope of the power be
expanded to cover any state act that Congress deemed “improper.”   Madison57
seconded the motion, insisting that “an indefinite power to negative legislative
acts of the States” was “absolutely necessary to a perfect system,” but the broader
language failed to win majority support.   Madison also argued that Congress58
ought to deploy agents into the states to allow for rapid federal assent to state
legislation—and, not incidentally, to drive home the point that the federal level
of government was a necessary participant in state lawmaking.59
Whether the delegates had ultimately granted Congress a negative “in all
cases whatsoever” (as Madison initially described it in his letters)  over60
“improper” state laws, or only over state laws that contravened the Constitution,
the result would have given Congress dramatically broader supervisory power
over the state legislatures than it possesses even under the broadest possible
conception of preemption.  Most significantly, the negative would have been an
enumerated power of Congress.  Had it been adopted, the negative would itself
have been committed to text as a structural provision built into the Constitution,
either in Article I or else, like the Supremacy Clause, in a subsequent provision
describing the functions of the constitutional system as a whole.  A Congress
invoking the negative would not need to point to a separate, enumerated,
substantive power under which it was acting.  In other words, a negativing
Congress would not be engaging in regulation, but rather exercising its structural
56. Virginia Plan, para. 6, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 12, 16
(1977).
57. Journal (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 18, at 162.
58. Id. at 164, 168.
59. Id. at 168 (“The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for by some emanation
of the power from the [National Government] into each State so far as to give a temporary assent
at least.”).
60. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
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authority to oversee the product of the state legislatures.
This structural power to negative stands in sharp contrast to the preemption
power.  Preemption doctrine permits Congress to override state laws in many
situations, but the preempting federal legislation must always be consistent with
Congress’s enumerated Article I powers.   In effect, the enumeration principle61
provides a substantive limitation on when Congress can preempt state laws. 
Moreover, in moments when the Supreme Court is construing Congress’s
enumerated powers narrowly, Congress might have more difficulty preempting
state legislation, or it might be less eager to attempt preemption.
A second important difference between the negative and preemption is the
default presumption of each mechanism toward the validity of state legislation. 
Under the regime of the negative, if Congress did not veto a particular state law,
the state law would stand.  But Madison’s presumption was that Congress could
intervene and brandish the negative whenever it chose.  Recall Madison’s
statement in the convention that “[t]he States [could] of themselves then pass no
operative act, any more than one branch of a Legislature where there are two
branches, can proceed without the other.”   On this view, Congress and the states62
would operate as a single compound legislature for purposes of state
lawmaking.   63
The Supreme Court’s case law on preemption, in contrast, has at least at
times articulated “the assumption that the historic . . . powers of the States [are]
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.”   To be sure, commentators have questioned whether this64
presumption against preemption truly exists,  while others have criticized the65
presumption.   Still, the fact remains that preemption’s invasiveness on state66
lawmaking processes varies widely depending on the subject matter of the
particular legislation and on the particular species of preemption (express, field,
or conflict) that Congress is arguably exercising.  Moreover, preemption is a
complex doctrinal area requiring judicial interpretation, especially with respect
to difficult questions of congressional intent.   Taken together, these differences67
61. The fact that federal regulations, as well as statutes, may have preemptive effect can add
an additional layer to this analysis.  See Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).  But such regulations must nevertheless be adopted pursuant to a validly
enacted federal statute, and therefore the enumeration analysis still applies.  
62. Madison’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 18, at 165.
63. See LACROIX, supra note 1, at 152.
64. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Napier v. Atl. Coast
Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740
(1942)), rev’d sub nom. Rice v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 331 U.S. 247 (1947); see also Bradford R.
Clark, Process-Based Preemption, in BUZBEE ET AL., supra note 54, at 192, 193.
65. See, e.g., Susan Raeker-Jordan, The Pre-Emption Presumption That Never Was:  Pre-
Emption Doctrine Swallows the Rule, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1379 (1998).
66. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000).
67. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption?: 
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in the two mechanisms’ default presumptions suggest that even the narrowest
version of the negative would have involved the federal government in state
lawmaking to a far greater degree than the current regime of preemption.
Finally, congressional silence would carry different meaning in the context
of the negative from the import it bears in the preemption context.  According to
Madison’s vision of the negative, if Congress did not veto a particular state act,
the act would stand.   Although the negative was based on the premise that68
Congress could intervene whenever it chose (the coordinate legislatures idea),
any action Congress did take would be clear cut:  either a veto, or assent via one
of the agents of federal authority that Madison described as an “emanation of the
power from the [National Government] into each State.”   But in a system with69
the negative, what would be the meaning of silence—neither a veto nor
assent—from Congress?  At some point, would silence become in effect a
ratification of state law?
The records of Madison’s plans do not provide many details about how he
envisioned the negative actually operating in practice.  Besides his statement that
the negative ought to be “lodged in the senate alone,” and his reference to
emanations of federal authority into the states,  it is difficult to obtain a sense70
of, for example, the timeline for the negative’s exercise.  Had the delegates
approved the negative, one imagines that within a few decades, the Senate would
have formed a committee to oversee the review of state laws and would have
established rules governing procedural matters such as the deadline for vetoing
a state law and the point at which a state law could be considered ratified and not
simply not vetoed.  This committee on the negative would presumably also have
had to coordinate the Senate’s processes with those of the Council of Revision,71
perhaps by sending notice to the Council of the Senate’s intention to veto a state
law.  Such notice would then trigger the Council’s duty to “examine . . . every act
of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final,” in the words
of the Virginia Plan.72
In short, putting the negative into operation would have required Congress,
as well as the other branches of the federal government, to produce a significant
body of procedural rules.  Uncertainty regarding Congress’s intentions would
have meant enormous costs to state law, norms of state sovereignty, and
individuals’ reliance on stable legal rules.  Eighteenth-century Americans’
experiences waiting for the Privy Council’s verdict on specific colonial statutes
had taught them the perils of long periods of review.  Indeed, charges that George
III had permitted his councilors to delay their review of colonial laws had formed
A Case Study of the Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996).
68. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
69. Madison’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 18, at 168.
70. Id.
71. See Virginia Plan, para. 8, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 4, at 12, 16
(1977).
72. Id.
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one of the particular grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence.  73
Consequently, one can reasonably assume that the Constitution’s drafters and
ratifiers would not have been content to leave the details of the negative’s
operation ambiguous, especially the key question whether a veto had issued or
not.
In the preemption realm, by contrast, many unresolved questions surround
the meaning of congressional silence.  As in the context of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, courts and commentators are routinely forced to try to
determine when congressional silence exists, when it is meaningful, and when it
is simply the result of inattention, unintentional inaction, or the hierarchy of
legislators’ priorities.   Also like the Dormant Commerce Clause, preemption74
analysis is paradigmatically undertaken by courts, unlike the negative’s
legislature-centered procedures.75
In short, important textual, functional, and ideological differences between
the negative and preemption suggest that not only does the modern American
constitutional system not have the negative, the preemption doctrine that it does
have would have failed to satisfy many of the central concerns about the issue of
supremacy that occupied late-eighteenth-century constitutional thinkers.
III.  A COUNTERFACTUAL NINETEENTH-CENTURY CASE STUDY
Given these arguments that preemption is not the modern equivalent of the
negative, and that the key aspects of Madison’s negative therefore did not survive
the Philadelphia Convention, it is possible to ask the true what-if question:  what
if the Constitution had contained the negative?  Possible sites of counterfactual
historical exploration abound.  Let us focus on an example from the early
nineteenth century:  the debates over Congress’s power to supersede state
legislation in the realm of interstate commerce as those debates were crystallized
in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden.   This case study suggests that rather than76
leading to greater centralization, the presence of the negative might well have
helped foment sectional crisis by raising the stakes of federalism-related debates
throughout the early national period.
The facts of Gibbons present the paradigmatic early-nineteenth-century
scenario of state regulation intersecting with federal legislation in the context of
73. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 4 (U.S. 1776) (“He has forbidden his
Governors to pass Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation
till his Assent should be obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to
them.”).
74. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(observing that some state and local restraints on interstate commerce are “individually too petty,
too diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent
matters,” and therefore the Court is justified in engaging in Dormant Commerce Clause analysis).
75. See Yates’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 18, at 169, 169-70.
76. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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the technological and commercial developments of the post-1815 market
revolution.   Familiar as they are, facts are particularly important for a77
counterfactual inquiry, so let us briefly review them.   Aaron Ogden acquired a78
license from John Livingston, who had previously required it from Robert Fulton
and Robert Livingston, to operate a ferry between Manhattan and Elizabethtown
Point in New Jersey.   Livingston had been chancellor of New York; Fulton had79
invented and patented the first steamboat.   A New York statute gave Fulton and80
Livingston the exclusive right to operate steamboats in New York waters; Ogden
claimed that that right was transferred to him along with the license.  81
Subsequently, Ogden’s former partner Thomas Gibbons began operating a
competing ferry service in New York waters.   Provoked by Ogden’s claims that82
his license was exclusive, Gibbons challenged Ogden to a duel, but
Ogden—prudently and in keeping with changing mores of conflict resolution in
the early nineteenth century—instead filed a trespass action.   Subsequently,83
Ogden filed an injunction suit in New York’s Court of Chancery arguing that
Gibbons’s competing ferry violated the state legislature’s grant of a monopoly
to Fulton and Livingston, and therefore to Ogden.   Ogden prevailed in the Court84
of Chancery, where Chancellor James Kent upheld the New York grant.   The85
chancery decision was affirmed by New York’s Court for the Trial of
Impeachments and Correction of Errors,  and Gibbons later appealed to the U.S.86
Supreme Court.   In support of his claim, Gibbons cited a 1793 act of Congress87
titled “An Act for Enrolling and Licensing Ships or Vessels to be Employed in
the Coasting Trade and Fisheries, and for Regulating the Same.”   Gibbons88
argued that his steamboats (the Bellona and the Stoudinger) were licensed under
77. See generally DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT:  THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848 (David M. Kennedy ed., 2007) (characterizing the early
nineteenth century as a communications and technological revolution); CHARLES SELLERS, THE
MARKET REVOLUTION:  JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815-1846 (1991) (characterizing the same period
as a market revolution).
78. See generally MAURICE G. BAXTER, THE STEAMBOAT MONOPOLY:  GIBBONS V. OGDEN,
1824 (Paul Murphy ed., 1972) (discussing the facts of Gibbons v. Ogden); THOMAS H. COX,
GIBBONS V. OGDEN, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2009) (discussing Gibbons v.
Ogden); Norman R. Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398 (2004) (discussing Gibbons v.
Ogden).
79. See Williams, supra note 78, at 1408.
80. Id. at 1407.
81. Id. at 1407-08.
82. Id. at 1408.
83. See BAXTER, supra note 78, at 32.
84. Id. at 33.
85. See Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150 (N.Y. Ch. 1819), aff’d, 17 Johns. 488 (N.Y.
1820), rev’d, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
86. Gibbons, 17 Johns. 488.
87. Williams, supra note 78, at 1410.
88. Act of Feb. 18, 1793, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 305.
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this federal statute, and consequently that the New York monopoly was invalid.89
Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion for the Court today seems to bear an
aura of hornbook inevitability, making it an ideal candidate for counterfactual
examination.  After engaging in a wide-ranging exploration of the Commerce
Clause, Marshall determined that Congress did have the power to involve itself
in steamboat traffic in New York Harbor.   The Court concluded that the New90
York monopoly must yield before the federal coasting statute.   Marshall found91
that the New York statute came into “collision” with the act of Congress, and that
the Supremacy Clause therefore required the Court to strike down the state law.  92
“[T]he framers of our constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for
it, by declaring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in
pursuance of it,” Marshall wrote.   In cases of collision such as this one, “the act93
of Congress, or the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though enacted
in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”   Thus, the Court94
held that the federal coasting statute applied to the steamboat trade in New York
Harbor, that it was a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power, and—most
important for our purposes—that the New York monopoly grant conflicted with
the federal statute, and the state law therefore must give way.95
Thus for the factual; now to the counterfactual.  What would the result have
been in Gibbons in a constitutional world with the negative?  Is this even a valid
question, or in such a world would the case even have come before the Court as
it did?
On one view, Gibbons would have produced the same result even in the
regime of the negative.  Marshall’s argument can be read to point strongly in this
direction.  Here the timeline becomes important.  Congress passed the federal
coasting statute in 1793; New York granted the original monopoly to Fulton and
Livingston in 1798, and in 1807—upon Livingston and Fulton’s production of
a steamboat capable of reaching the speed of five miles per hour—extended the
monopoly for thirty years.   With the negative at its disposal, Congress might96
well have simply vetoed either the original 1798 state monopoly grant or the
1807 extension.  Had Congress needed to offer a justification for the veto, it
could have cited the conflict with the coasting statute or a general federal interest
in promoting interstate commerce (both points that Marshall’s decision later
emphasized).   Especially given contemporary uncertainty on the question97
whether Congress’s power over interstate commerce was exclusive rather than
89. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 239-40 (1824).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 240.
92. Id. at 221.
93. Id. at 210.
94. Id. at 211.
95. Id. at 221-22.
96. Williams, supra note 78, at 1407.
97. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 206, 210.
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concurrently held with the states,  one can easily imagine a coalition of98
Federalist or National Republican senators, senators from landlocked interior
states who depended on navigable rivers, and senators who generally supported
commerce and development coming together to wield the negative against the
New York monopoly.
Yet it is also possible to question the apparently seamless logic of Marshall’s
reasoning.   Indeed, one need look no further than the writings of the great99
Chancellor Kent to find rebuttals to the Chief Justice’s arguments.  In upholding
the New York monopoly, and in his later Commentaries, Kent took note of the
federal coasting statute but disputed Marshall’s interpretation of the statute’s
purpose and effect.   Kent argued that it was not clear that Congress had100
intended to supplant all state regulation of interstate commerce on water.  101
Moreover, Kent and other critics (including Ogden’s lawyers) argued that the
purpose of the federal coasting statute might simply be to designate a vessel as
American in order to avoid its being subjected to foreign-vessel tariffs.   The102
federal law might not actually confer an affirmative right to navigate, let alone
an exclusive right, contrary to Marshall’s suggestion.  Thus, the combined
arguments of Ogden’s advocates, Kent for the court below, and Kent and others
as commentators offered strong challenge to Marshall’s premise that the case
presented a “collision” between state and federal law.  Challenging that premise
in turn calls into question Marshall’s conclusion that simple application of the
Supremacy Clause required that the state law be invalidated.
Counterfactual interpretation depends in large part on the version of the facts
that the counterfactualist chooses to begin with.  If one accepts Marshall’s
interpretation of the Gibbons facts, in a world with the negative, Congress would
most likely have simply vetoed the New York monopoly at some point prior to
1824; Gibbons would clearly have been able to operate his competing steamboat
concern; and the case would never have come before the Court.  But if one
adopts Kent’s competing theory of the facts, Congress might never have vetoed
the New York monopoly, even if it had the power of the negative, because it
would not have occurred to Congress that it ought to block state laws of this type. 
The Kent theory, then, suggests that the presence of the negative might well have
made little difference, and that the dispute between Gibbons and Ogden—and the
98. See, e.g., id. at 209 (“It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, that, as the
word ‘to regulate’ implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes,
necessarily, the action of all others that would perform the same operation on the same thing. . . .
There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.”).  But
see generally Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (resolving the question
in favor of concurrence and rejecting the exclusive view of Congress’s commerce power).
99. See Williams, supra note 78, at 1399 (describing Marshall’s interpretation of the federal
coasting statute as “a stretch”).
100. See id. at 1409.
101. See Ogden v. Gibbons, 4 Johns. Ch. 150, 156 (N.Y. Ch. 1819), aff’d, 17 Johns. 488 (N.Y.
1820), rev’d, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
102. See id.
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ensuing collision between federal and state law—would have unfolded just as it
did.
Gibbons demonstrates the degree to which a counterfactual inquiry into the
negative returns again and again to the issue of congressional silence.  In a
regime with the negative, if New York passes the monopoly statute and Congress
does nothing, what result?  Might that inquiry depend on the particular moment
in question—Congress doing nothing when the monopoly was first granted in
1798, versus doing nothing when the monopoly was extended in 1807? 
Congressional silence might mean, or be taken by contemporaries used to dealing
with this question in the regime of the negative to mean, that New York could
grant the monopoly.  This result would be a very different outcome from the
decision in Gibbons.  Or, on the contrary, congressional silence might mean that
New York could not grant the monopoly, insofar as the silence amounted to a
lack of federal assent.  Such a view might have been most compatible with
Madison’s goals for the negative.  In addition, the view that congressional silence
was fatal to the state monopoly would have been consistent with Marshall’s hint
in Gibbons that federal power over interstate commerce might be exclusive.  So,
if in a world with the negative, Congress did not veto the New York monopoly
and the case ended up before the Court, a justice of Marshall’s convictions might
have simply pointed to the lack of congressional assent to hold that the state law
was invalid.  Each of these counterfactual scenarios presents one significant
difference from the actual constitutional world of the nineteenth century, and
indeed the twentieth century:  the possibility that the contours of the federal
commerce power might have been elaborated by conflict between Congress and
the state legislatures, rather than the Supreme Court.
Of course, as Madison pointed out in the convention debates, the mere fact
of the negative’s existence might well deter the states from regulating for fear of
prompting a veto.   Whether such a chilling effect on state legislation would be103
desirable or not, however, one can equally imagine the effect of the negative in
the early nineteenth century as driving some states to become more resistant to
federal power.  By explicitly building state-federal conflict into the Constitution,
the negative would arguably have prompted conflict between the levels of
government, rather than confining it to a specific case or controversy, as judicial
review for the most part did.  One consequence of the negative might therefore
have been to galvanize state sovereignty at an early moment in the Republic’s
history.  Rather than state sovereignty arguments occasionally surfacing (e.g., the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798-99, the Hartford Convention during
the War of 1812) before reaching a constant roar in the nullification conflict of
the 1830s and the secession crisis of the 1860s, the constitutional shouting and
brinksmanship would have begun in the nation’s first years.  Moreover, the
friction from below would likely have been widespread, sweeping in not only
slaveholding states but diverse interests such as New York’s impulse to protect
103. See Madison’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 18, at 164 (quoting Madison’s statement that “[t]he existence of such a check
would prevent attempts to commit” aggressive acts of legislation against other states or the Union).
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its harbor traffic  and Maryland’s and Ohio’s opposition to the Bank of the104
United States.105
One can certainly tell an optimistic counterfactual story about a
constitutional world with the negative.  On this view, the negative might have
staved off the sectional crisis, and perhaps even the Civil War, by establishing
a clear rule of federal supremacy and staving off the expansion of slavery into the
territories, and perhaps even the continuation of slavery where it existed.   But106
one can also tell at least two more sinister stories.  In one, the negative would
have permitted slaveholding interests to have captured the federal level of
government far more completely than the “slave power conspiracy” that
periodically held the Court, the Senate, and the presidency was able to do,
resulting in a federalization of proslavery views.   A more diffusely pessimistic107
story suggests that whatever its substantive outcomes, the presence of the
negative would have increased the salience of state sovereignty claims, creating
more arenas of dispute between state and federal power, and perhaps uniting
diverse states behind a broad banner of resistance to federal—or at least
congressional—authority.
CONCLUSION
The federal negative is a fundamentally different species of structural
mechanism from the Constitution’s existing modes of judicial review and
congressional preemption.  The negative is typically seen as a highly centralizing
mechanism; that was clearly Madison’s purpose in promoting it at the
Philadelphia Convention, and indeed for the rest of his life.   Madison and108
others believed that the negative was the best available solution to the problem
of institutionalizing federal supremacy.   Commentators ever since have viewed109
it as evidence of Madison’s nationalism.   But had the negative succeeded, it110
104. See Ogden, 4 Johns. Ch. at 164-65.
105. See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
106. See generally Arthur Bestor, The American Civil War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 AM.
HIST. REV. 327 (1964) (describing the Civil War as resulting in large part from the channeling of
many disputes into a framework of constitutional law).
107. See generally LEONARD L. RICHARDS, THE SLAVE POWER:  THE FREE NORTH AND
SOUTHERN DOMINATION, 1780-1860 (1st ed. 2000) (discussing and analyzing the slave power
thesis).
108. As late as 1831, five years before his death, Madison continued to defend his proposal
for the negative.  See Letter from James Madison to Nicholas Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 471, 473 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910).
109. See Madison’s Notes (June 8, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, supra note 18, at 164-70 (citing discussion of the Negative at the Federal Convention of
1787). 
110. See Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism:  Madison’s Negative and the
Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 451, 462 n.31 (2010).
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might well have led to fragmentation and disintegration between the federal
center and the state peripheries in the early years of the nation’s history, long
before the antebellum sectional controversy began.  The negative might have
brought more centralization, but at the price of raising every conflict to a
constitutional crisis decades before the Civil War.  
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